A ship run aground Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy. OSW Commentary Number 173, 16 June 2015 by Iwanski, Tadeusz
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 173
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 173 | 16.06.2015
A ship run aground 
Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy
Tadeusz Iwański
The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corre-
sponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 
14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against 
the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated 
the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason 
behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn 
Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign tra-
de (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading vo-
lume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had 
a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian econo-
my: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports.
The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the 
Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the  citizens and companies of Ukraine. 
No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, 
have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. 
The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s 
traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties ma-
king up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy 
prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew 
by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure 
from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments 
to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western 
institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The 
issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors 
who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether 
Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the 
country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukra-
ine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually 
implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.
Negative figures
Current macroeconomic indicators tracking 
the condition of the Ukrainian economy sug-
gest that the rapid decline observed in the 
fourth quarter of 2014 has continued in the 
first months of 2015. In 2014, the drop in GDP 
was 6.8% (in the fourth quarter of 2014 it 
was 14.8%), and in the first quarter of 2015 
it was 17.2%. At the end of March 2015, total 
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public debt amounted to approximately 95% 
of GDP (over 1.5 trillion hryvnias, i.e. almost 
US$ 65 billion1), and the inflation rate was 25%; 
in April 2015 it rose to 61% (versus April 2014). 
Due to the war in the Donbas – Ukraine’s most 
industrialised region – and the loss of Crimea, 
in 2014 Ukraine’s industrial production fell by 
nearly 11%. In the first quarter of 2015, a de-
cline of 21.4% was recorded (as compared to 
the first three months of 2014), which was 
mainly due to shrinking industrial production in 
the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, which in that 
period fell by 52.5% and 88% respectively. Ad-
ditionally, for Ukraine another major problem 
has been the serious devaluation of the hryvnia 
– in the period between February 2014 and the 
end of February 2015, the Ukrainian currency 
fell against the US dollar from the level of 8 
hryvnias for 1 US$ to 30 hryvnias for 1 US$. In 
the months that followed, the hryvnia slight-
ly recovered its value and the exchange rate 
has stabilised at the level of approximately 21 
hryvnias for 1 US$. Currency depreciation has 
been one of the factors behind a serious cri-
sis in the Ukrainian banking sector. Stress tests 
comprising Ukraine’s 35 largest banks, which 
ended in November 2014, revealed a deep cri-
sis in the banking sector. The observation was 
confirmed when the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU) considered 33 banks insolvent in 2014 
and a further 25 in the first quarter of 2015 
(including Delta Bank, one of the five largest 
banks in Ukraine). An increase in the value of 
the hryvnia observed since mid-March (finally 
reaching the level of 21–22 hryvnias for 1 US$ 
1 Бюджетний літопис: 1 квартал 2015 року, Case-Ukra-
ine, June 17, 2015.
in the second half of May) was possible due to 
radical administrative measures taken by the 
NBU2 and to financial assistance granted by the 
International Monetary Fund3.
According to forecasts by the National Bank 
of Ukraine, in 2015 GDP is expected to fall by 
7.5%4, whereas a reverse trend is expected to 
start in the fourth quarter of 2015 to reach the 
level of 3% at the end of 2016. The IMF, on the 
other hand, expects a 9% recession in 20155. 
No further decline would be expected only in 
the event that reforms are carried out and the 
truce in the east of the country is sustained. 
Any further escalation of the conflict would be 
likely to result in further deterioration of the 
Ukrainian economy.
New loans and uncertain restructuring 
of old loans
Ukraine has so far been saved from bankrupt-
cy by Western financial institutions. According 
to estimates by Case-Ukraine, in the period be-
tween May 2014 and May 2015, the IMF, the EU, 
the World Bank, the USA and the governments 
of Canada and Japan granted assistance to 
Ukraine amounting in total to US$ 14.2 billion6. 
However, it is the cooperation with the IMF that 
is of crucial importance for the fragile stability 
of the Ukrainian economy. On 11 March 2015, 
the IMF’s Board of Directors decided to grant 
a loan to Ukraine worth US$ 17.5 billion as part of 
a four-year programme known as the Extended 
Fund Facility. In February 2015, this programme 
replaced a two-year stand-by programme, in 
2 T. Iwański, Władze ratują hrywnę, Analizy OSW, 4 May 
2015.
3 R. Sadowski, Nowy program pomocy MFW dla Ukrainy, 
Analizy OSW, 12 February 2015.
4 A member of the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine, 
Roman Shpek, has even mentioned a 9% drop, ВВП 
Украины к концу 2015 года упадет на 9% - НБУ, zn.ua, 
25 May 2015.
5 IMF Statement on Discussions with Ukraine on First 
Reviewunder the Extended Fund FacilityArrangement, 
Press Release, No. 15/243, 31 May 2015.
6 Ціна держави: популярна економіка. Україна 
отримала ще €250 млн від ЄС, 23 April 2015.
In the final quarter of 2014, the drop in 
GDP was 14.8%, and in the first quarter of 
2015 it accelerated to 17.6%.
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force since April 2014, worth US$ 17 billion, 
under which Ukraine received US$ 4.6 billion. 
In exchange for the new, four-year financial aid 
formula granted by the IMF, Ukraine commit-
ted itself to carry out measures aimed at stabi-
lising the economic situation and implementing 
structural reforms. In 2015, Kyiv will be likely to 
receive as much as 60% of the allocated sum; 
the first instalment amounting to US$ 5 billion 
was paid out on 13 March. Another instalment, 
worth approximately US$ 2.5 billion, is likely 
to be paid in June or July 2015. This, however, 
depends on whether negotiations on restruc-
turing Ukraine’s foreign debt (approximately 
US$ 15.5 billion) bring a positive result. The ne-
gotiations were launched in April 2015 with one 
of the aims being to extend the debt payment 
deadline and to change the payment conditions. 
The government is hoping to reach a preliminary 
agreement by the end of June 2015. The fact that 
the state-owned Ukreksimbank has managed to 
extend the maturity deadline for bonds worth 
US$ 750 million by another three months (the 
initial maturity date was 27 April) can be seen as 
a positive sign. Western lenders, including inter-
national investment funds such as Franklin Tem-
pleton, have recently consented to extending the 
maturity date and to reducing the yield on such 
bonds. At the same time, a proposal by Ukraine’s 
Ministry of Finance to cancel 40% of the country’s 
liabilities has been rejected so far. This sparked 
sharp reactions in Kyiv; in order to exert pres-
sure on lenders, on 19 May the Supreme Council 
passed a law which entitles the central govern-
ment and local government bodies to suspend 
repayments and the servicing of foreign debt es-
timated to reach US$ 30 billion in the next four 
years. The liabilities indicated in the document 
included two-year bonds issued by Viktor Yanu-
kovych’s administration and purchased by Russia 
in December 2013. The value of these bonds is 
US$ 3 billion. Russia’s government has repeat-
edly announced that they would not consent to 
any restructuring of these bonds. This is intend-
ed as an attempt at breaking solidarity among 
Ukraine’s external creditors who do not agree to 
any partial cancellation of debt, if this cancellation 
is not going to include Ukraine’s debt to Russia.
The key importance of the Donbas region
As a result of the de-escalation of the military 
situation in the Donbas region in mid-February 
2015, the separatists now control approximate-
ly 2.5% of Ukraine’s territory (excluding Crimea), 
including the country’s most industrialised and 
urbanised regions. It is estimated that the ter-
ritory under separatist control used to account 
for 9% of Ukraine’s GDP, 12% of its industrial 
potential and 14% of its exports7. This has been 
the main cause of the disastrous condition of 
the Ukrainian economy and of the extremely 
negative macroeconomic indicators.
In the current situation, the government in Kyiv 
has decided to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict 
in the Donbas region and to gradually reduce 
the scale of funding the region receives from 
the central budget8. After withholding the 
payment of social benefits in autumn 2014 to 
residents who failed to re-register on Kyiv-con-
trolled territories, the government decided to 
suspend the supply of gas to the region starting 
from 1 April until the end of the year9. In addi-
tion, on 10 April the payments for the supply of 
energy from Russia to the occupied territories 
7 Експерти: українська економіка досягла дна. Далі 
лише шлях нагору, Holos Ameryki, 7 May 2015.
8 More on this topic: T. Iwański, ‘Still together, but apart? 
Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas’, OSW Commentary, 
6 February 2015.
9 Про затвердження прогнозного балансу надходження 
та розподілу природного газу в Україні на 2015 рік, 
Regulation by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
no. 410-p, 15 April 2015.
The agreement with the IMF is of crucial 
importance to Ukraine, but the payment of 
subsequent instalments is conditional upon 
the implementation of reforms and restruc-
turing of old loans.
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in the Donbas region were suspended10, and 
on 1 May these territories were excluded from 
the Ukrainian energy market and a ban was in-
troduced on making energy purchase and sale 
contracts between the territories controlled by 
the central government and those remaining 
outside its control11.
At the same time, due to the lack of control over 
a part of the Donbas region and the severing 
of institutional and financial ties with the re-
gion, in the 2015–2016 heating season Ukraine 
is likely to have a serious deficit of coal of high 
calorific value which is used by half of Ukrainian 
heat and power plants to generate energy. Un-
til recently, a lack of consensus within Ukraine’s 
leadership is evident as regards the issue of coal 
supplies from the separatist-controlled territo-
ries. State officials associated with President Po-
roshenko, including the head of the President’s 
administration office Boris Lozhkin and the 
ex-governor of the Donetsk oblast Oleksands 
Kikhtenko, have been supporting the plan to 
enter into relevant contracts on this matter, 
whereas the plan’s opponents include the Min-
ister of the Interior Arsen Avakov, who is asso-
ciated with Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk12. 
The final decision, however, will depend on the 
development of the military situation in the 
Donbas region. It is likely, however, that should 
10 В.Пиріг, Україна припинила платити за електрику, яку 
Росія постачає в зону АТО, Zaxid.net, 20 April 2015.
11 Про особливості регулювання відносин у сфері 
електроенергетики на території, де органи державної 
влади тимчасово не здійснюють або здійснюють не 
в повному обсязі свої повноваження, Regulation by 
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine no. 263, 7 May 2015.
12 АП виступила за економічну співпрацю з окупованим 
Донбасом, lb.ua, 30 April 2015.
the status quo be maintained and the railway 
infrastructure be rebuilt by mid-August (which 
is when the stock of coal at heat and power 
plants needs to be replenished – the estimated 
demand is approximately 2.5–3 million tonnes), 
Kyiv would take steps to legalize its cooperation 
with separatists in this field.
A decline in foreign trade
The halt in industrial production in the territo-
ries affected by military action and the deval-
uation of the hryvnia were the main reasons 
behind the negative trends in Ukraine’s foreign 
trade. The Ukrainian economy used to be (and 
to a certain extent continues to be) dependent 
on foreign markets. Approximately 50% of 
the country’s GDP is generated by export in-
dustries. Although last year Ukraine recorded 
a positive balance of foreign trade turnover of 
US$ 3.8 billion13, this was due to the dramatic 
decline in the imports – by 28%; (mainly from 
Russia: by a staggering 45%), while exports fell 
by 13.5% (exports to Russia – by 34%).
Although Russia remains Kyiv’s main trade part-
ner (in 2014 it accounted for 18% of Ukraine’s 
exports and 23% of its imports), over the last 
year its significance in these two fields has con-
tinued to diminish, by 5.5% and 7.2% respec-
tively. In 2014, the overall trade exchange with 
Russia shrank by as much as 43%. This was 
mainly due to an aggressive policy by Moscow, 
including its economic policy, which was re-
flected in imposing a number of trade restric-
tions on Ukraine and temporarily withholding 
the supply of gas to the country14. Other signif-
icant factors have included Ukraine’s reduction 
in the amount of gas it purchases from Gaz-
prom and the dramatic shrinking of industrial 
13 In this section data after: the National Statistical Service 
of Ukraine; www.ukrstat.gov.ua
14 For more on the reasons behind the drop in trade ex-
change with Russia see: T. Iwański, ‘Ukrainian economy 
overshadowed by war’, OSW Commentary, 8 October 
2014; the hindering factors discussed in the text contin-
ue to be valid. 
In 2014, the volume of trade with Russia, 
which continues to be Ukraine’s major 
trade partner, shrank by 43%, and in the 
first quarter of 2015 it fell by 63% (year-
on-year).
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production in the regions affected by the mili-
tary conflict (it shrank by 31.5% in the Donetsk 
oblast and by 42% in the Luhansk oblast). This 
was particularly evident in the machine build-
ing and metallurgy sectors, which have tradi-
tionally been oriented to the Russian market. 
As a result of tensions in political relations, 
negative trends continued in the first quarter 
of 2015, which was when the trade exchange 
with Russia fell by a 63%, as compared to the 
same period in 2014. 
Positive indicators concerning Ukrainian foreign 
trade have been recorded in the country’s re-
lations with the EU, although the growth rate 
has been lower than expected. In 2014, exports 
of Ukrainian goods to EU markets increased by 
only 2.6% (they make up 31.5% in Ukraine’s ex-
port structure), including an increase in exports 
to Poland of 4%. This was despite the unilateral 
introduction by Brussels in April 2014 of the so-
called Autonomous Trade Preferences, accord-
ing to which many Ukrainian goods are covered 
by zero customs duty. The decline in exports to 
the EU recorded in the second half of 2014 was 
additionally caused by insufficient re-orientation 
of Ukrainian production to EU markets, as not 
all Ukrainian producers have managed to adapt 
to the requirements of EU standards, or build up 
a network of contractors.
The figures for the first quarter of 2015 as regards 
total foreign trade in goods have confirmed the 
negative tendencies present in the economy. 
Compared to the same period in 2014, exports 
fell by 33%, and imports by 36.5%. At the same 
time, statistics compiled for this period have in-
dicated certain positive trends. A positive bal-
ance of trade was maintained, reaching over 
US$ 384 million, and the downward trends in ex-
ports and imports were halted. In January 2015, 
trade turnover continued to decline rapidly, as 
compared to December 2014. In February 2015, 
however, stabilisation of the trend was record-
ed, followed by a slight move upwards in March 
2015 (by less than 1% versus the previous month). 
This suggests that should the fragile truce in the 
east of the country be maintained, the downward 
trend would be likely to be exhausted and a re-
turn to a positive growth rate would be possible.
Metallurgy and agriculture – problems 
of the Ukrainian economy’s driving forces
The breaking of economic ties between Ukraine 
and the separatist-occupied part of the Donbas 
region has had a negative impact not only on 
the forecasts regarding the coal mining indus-
try, but also on the metallurgy sector which is 
related to it and continues to be crucial for the 
Ukrainian economy. Back in 2014, this branch of 
industry generated nearly a quarter of export 
revenues, despite a decline in the production 
of steel (by as much as 17%, down to 27 mil-
lion tonnes), while the production of cast iron 
fell by 15% (to 25 million tonnes) and of rolled 
metal products by 18% (25 million tonnes)15. 
In the first quarter of 2015, the rate of decline 
in production was 26% - in that period only 
4 million tonnes of steel were exported, a drop 
of 29%, compared to the previous year. Indus-
trial output of metallurgical conglomerates has 
deteriorated over the last few years, mainly due 
to a worsening situation in foreign markets and 
to the technological backwardness of Ukrainian 
enterprises. The events in the east of the coun-
try contributed to a rapid degradation of this 
branch of industry. As a result of the war in the 
Donbas region, large metallurgical conglomer-
ates, including those in Donetsk (Donetskstal), 
Yenakiieve and Alchevsk, were forced to tem-
15 Data compiled by Metalurhprom, http://metallurgprom.
org/?cat=18
In the first quarter of 2015, the war in the 
Donbas region caused a 26% drop in pro-
duction in the metallurgical industry and 
a decline in exports of 29%.
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porarily halt their operation (the first two re-
sumed their activities in April and in February 
respectively, and the third one announced they 
would do so in May). Other plants operating 
in Kyiv-controlled territories, such as the Ilyich 
Iron and Steel Works and Azovstal in Mariupol, 
limited their production due to raw material 
shortages and destruction of railway infrastruc-
ture. In mid-May, reconstruction of production 
potential was further hindered after shelling by 
the separatists of a coke plant in Avdiivka, one of 
Europe’s largest plants of this type. Apart from 
this year’s decline in industrial production, oth-
er trends present in foreign markets are likely 
to have a negative impact on the performance 
of the Ukrainian metallurgical sector. In March 
2015, the global price of iron ore dropped to 
the level of US$ 49.5 per tonne, the lowest in 
a decade16, and over 70% of production by 
Ukrainian metallurgical conglomerates is ex-
ported mainly to China and to Russia. Accord-
ing to estimates, the price of ore at the level of 
US$ 60 per one tonne hardly covers the cost of 
its production in Ukraine17. Top Ukrainian pro-
ducers have been severely affected by the war 
in the Donbas region and by the drop in global 
prices. On 9 April 2015, Ukraine’s largest met-
allurgical conglomerate Metinvest, owned by 
Rinat Akhmetov and Vadym Novinsky, declared 
partial bankruptcy and announced a launch of 
negotiations with its creditors regarding repay-
ment of some of its bonds.
Poor conditions in the metallurgical sector have 
emphasised another trend observed in the 
Ukrainian economy, i.e. the increasing impor-
tance of the agriculture and food processing 
sector as well as the growing share of agricul-
tural production, mainly grains, in the country’s 
export structure. In the first two months of 
2015, this share was 39%, an increase of 9% 
compared to the same period in the previous 
16 Iron Ore’s 10-Year Low Not Slowing China Production-
Push, Bloomberg Business, 31 March 2015.
17 Чим загрожує обвал цін на руду?, Forbes, 11 December 
2014.
year18. The agricultural sector has large poten-
tial, which is confirmed by the fact that in 2014, 
despite a reduction of 4.6% in the size of crops 
compared to 2013 and the loss of Crimea, the 
volume of the grain harvest and of pulses in-
creased by 2.4%. The wheat and barley harvest 
recorded a notable increase (9.9% and 23 %, re-
spectively), while the corn harvest fell by 7.8%, 
which, however, had no impact on export reve-
nues due to negative corn price fluctuations on 
global markets. This made it possible in 2014 to 
achieve a record harvest of 63.7 million tonnes 
of grains and pulses. The 2013–2014 trade year 
was also very favourable for Ukraine as it ex-
ported 32.1 million tonnes of grains to become 
the world’s second largest (excluding the EU 
as a whole) exporter of grains after the USA19. 
This good result was achieved not only due to 
favourable weather conditions, but also as a re-
sult of the deteriorating, although stable and 
predictable until the beginning of autumn, eco-
nomic situation in Ukraine and in the Ukrainian 
banking sector.
At the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, 
the situation worsened dramatically and the 
Ukrainian economy found itself on the brink 
of bankruptcy. In order to rescue the economic 
situation and to sustain the hryvnia’s exchange 
rate, the government of Ukraine decided to in-
troduce a number of regulations which in prac-
tice hamstrung the operation of agricultural 
companies. The measures introduced by the 
government included a 10% import duty on cer-
18 http://economics.unian.ua/agro/1072359-analitiki-ukra-
jinskiy-eksport-zalishitsya-agrarno-spryamovanim.html
19 Д.Денков, Сезон зернотрейдера, Економічна Правда, 
4 August 2014.
According to worst case scenarios, which 
account for unfavourable weather condi-
tions, at the end of 2015 the volume of the 
grain harvest may fall by 15-20%.
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tain products used in the sowing period. Addi-
tionally, the central bank raised the base rate up 
to 30%, which boosted the lending cost. In the 
amended Tax Code, fiscal pressure on produc-
ers operating in the agricultural and food pro-
cessing sector was increased, which resulted in 
a rise in the average levy paid to the state for 1 
hectare from 6 hryvnias in 2014 to 115 hryvnias 
in 201520. These factors contributed to a sharp 
increase in the outlays for spring field works, 
resulting from a rise in the price of petrol, and 
of some of imported seeds, crop protection 
products and fertilisers, as well as agricultur-
al machines and their spare parts. Moreover, it 
has been increasingly difficult for agricultural 
producers to take out a loan. In these circum-
stances, the farmers carried out the spring sow-
ing based to a large extent on their own means 
– either covering smaller land21, or using lower 
quality seeds and fertilisers, which in turn has 
translated into worse harvests. Due to a con-
flict between the government and the oligarch 
Dmytro Firtash, the prospects for the autumn 
sowing season are uncertain. The Ostchem 
company owned by Firtash, which controls two 
important plants producing nitrogen fertilisers 
in Cherkasy and Rivne, both of which are im-
portant for the entire market, announced in 
late May that it is going to halt its production22, 
which may cause a shortage of fertilisers and 
20 P. Charałamow, Кабмін збільшив податкове навантаження 
на АПК в 20 разів, RBK-Ukraina, 23 March 2015.
21 As of 1 May, the sowing area of spring grains was 20% 
smaller than the year before.
22 Фірташ зупини в роботу двох своїх заводів, espreso.tv, 
28 May 2015.
a need to import more costly substitutes. Ac-
cording to worst case scenarios which account 
for unfavourable weather conditions, at the 
end of 2015 the volume of the harvest may fall 
by 15–20%. If this proves true, it will be impos-
sible to achieve another record-high harvest of 
grains and pulses similar to the one reached in 
2014. It is expected that the harvest volume 
of grains and pulses might be lower and may 
stand at 50–55 million tonnes.
Ukraine’s unprecedented and difficult political 
and economic situation has brought a portion 
of large agricultural farms, so-called agrohold-
ings, which so far have been the driving force 
of the agricultural sector, to the brink of bank-
ruptcy. The main reason behind this situation 
has been the inability of farm owners to service 
their loans, mainly in foreign currencies, which 
were taken out on a large scale in previous 
years to increase the area of arable land and 
foster development of agricultural companies. 
This, in turn, was caused by depreciation of the 
hryvnia. The first negative symptoms became 
evident in August 2014, when the Mriya Agro 
Holding (Ukraine’s fifth largest agroholding in 
terms of the size of arable land) announced 
that it was unable to meet the deadline for 
repayment of its bonds worth US$ 400 mil-
lion23. Problems with financial liquidity have 
affected Ukraine’s major holdings, including 
the largest one – Ukrlandfarming, which at the 
end of last year reported a loss amounting to 
US$ 261 million, and its current liabilities are 
estimated at US$ 1.7 billion24. In May 2015, 
KSG Agro, a company listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange, announced that at the end of 
2014 it had reported a loss in the amount of 
US$ 40 million and its liabilities accounted for 
92% of the value of its assets.
23 Mriya’s problems also resulted from unclear and most 
probably illegal financial operations carried out by its own-
ers. See for example Д. Дєнков, Боргові проблеми “Мрії”: 
кінець близько, Економічнаправда, 30 January 2015.
24 Олег Бахматюк: Держимся на зубах, выжить бы, Liga.
net, 14 May 2015.
In the second half of 2015, macroeco-
nomic indicators will be likely to improve. 
However, this will be due to a low refer-
ence base rather than a real improvement 
of the economic situation.
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Conclusions
The decline of the Ukrainian economy started 
back in 2012 as a result of a lack of reforms 
and rapacious policies carried out by previous 
governments, in particular by officials associ-
ated with Viktor Yanukovych. Russia’s aggres-
sion against Ukraine has strikingly revealed the 
state’s problems and has become the main rea-
son behind the current economic collapse. Not 
only did it cause the degradation of Ukraine’s 
most industrialised region, presently uncon-
trolled by Kyiv, but it also triggered a collapse 
of the entire economic system, paralysing the 
normal functioning of Ukrainian companies, 
which faced currency depreciation, damage to 
infrastructure and disruption to production, as 
well as a lack of funds for investment. 
The current government of Ukraine, although 
forced to operate in unprecedented circumstanc-
es, has been rather sluggish in devising structural 
reforms and has failed to actually dismantle the 
oligarchic foundations of the state. Moreover, 
Western financial aid has been too limited in 
comparison to needs, and the payment of subse-
quent instalments has each time been dependent 
on the lender’s decisions. This may result in assis-
tance being insufficient and only likely to rescue 
Ukraine from going bankrupt if the fragile truce 
in the Donbas region is maintained.
At present, Ukraine needs to count mainly on the 
power of its business people, in particular those 
running small and medium companies. This is 
due to the fact that, because of the situation in 
the Donbas region, no major foreign investments 
should be expected and there are no prospects 
for regaining the Russian market. For this to be 
possible, bold de-regulatory measures would 
be necessary, accompanied by initial successes 
in combating corruption25. So far, the initiatives 
launched in these fields have been insufficient. 
It should be expected that in the following quar-
ters basic economic indicators will improve. How-
ever, this will be a result not so much of a real 
improvement of the economic situation as of the 
low reference base for year-on-year comparisons 
and the probable exclusion from government sta-
tistics of that part of the Donbas region not con-
trolled by Kyiv, similar to the case of Crimea after 
it was annexed by Russia. Currently, statistics are 
compiled with reference to a corresponding peri-
od in the previous year, when the condition of the 
Donbas region’s industry and infrastructure was 
considerably better (in the first quarter of 2014 
the region was not affected by war), and the state 
accrued higher profit from taxes contributed by 
the region and from exports generated by it.
A positive scenario for Ukraine involves stabilisa-
tion of the downward trends in the second half 
of 2015 and of the economic situation, as well 
as progress in implementing reforms required by 
the IMF, which determines the payment by the 
Fund of subsequent loan instalments. Success in 
negotiations with Western lenders over a restruc-
turing of the Ukrainian debt also seems probable. 
Otherwise, if the situation develops according to 
a negative scenario which mainly involves a re-
sumption of military escalation in the east of the 
country and a fiasco in external loan restructur-
ing, Kyiv might become insolvent, which would 
plunge the country into a long-lasting crisis. 
25 M. Jaroszewicz, P. Żochowski, Combating corruption in 
Ukraine – the beginning of a long march, OSW Commen-
tary, 7 May 2015.
